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  3. When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why tha

When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why tha

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问题    When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why that behaviour is biased. 【F1】To this end, they search for mechanisms that cause human behaviour to deviate from what seems to be the rational optimum. But perhaps human behaviour is not biased; perhaps research assumptions about the optimality of strategies are incomplete. In the one-shot anonymous symmetric ultimatum game (UG) (最后通牒游戏), humans fail to play optimally as defined by the Nash equilibrium. 【F2】However, the distinction between kin and non-kin—with kin detection being a key evolutionary adaption—is often neglected when deriving the "optimal" strategy.
   In the one-shot anonymous ultimatum game (UG), two players—a proposer and a responder—are tasked with an economic decision. First, the proposer suggests how to split a resource. This resource, provided by a third party, is set to 1.0. The offer defines the fraction that the proposer is willing to give to the responder. If the offer meets the responder’s demands, the resource will be split accordingly. If the offer is rejected, neither player will receive anything. The rational and most optimal strategy in this game differs markedly from the strategy observed in humans. This gap has been explained by showing that humans take other elements, such as the social context, into account when making decisions. 【F3】It comes to a conclusion that allowing players to discern between opponents that are kin and opponents that are not kin leads to the evolution of strategies that resemble those observed in humans—even if kinship detection is imperfect.
   To understand the evolution of strategies, a computational evolutionary mode was used to define a population of strategies as a set of points within the strategy space. We randomly selected a set of strategies to form the population of the first generation. 【F4】These selected strategies all played against each other, and not against every possible strategy—much as an organism does not interact with all other possible organisms, but only with those alive at the time. The next generation was formed from those strategies that earned a higher payoff playing the UG. Specifically, the probability of an organism having offspring was defined by the payoff it received divided by the total payoff the entire population received. However, variations could move the points defining the offspring’s strategy around in this space, providing a new set of opponents. 【F5】How this set of points moved through this space over time approximated how evolution would act on organisms whose existence depended solely on playing the UG.
【F3】
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答案可得出这样的结论：让玩家鉴别出对手是否与自己有亲缘关系将使策略进化，这些策略与人类身上观察到的策略是类似的——尽管亲缘鉴别并非尽善尽美。
解析 ①本句为多重复合句，句式较为复杂。其基本时态为一般现在时。主句中的It作形式主语，真正的主语为that引导的从句。②that allowing…从句为主语，还原过来就是that allowing…come to a conclusion“允许……成为了一个结论”，由此可知，主语从句allowing players to discern between opponents leads to the evolution of strategies即为结论的具体内容。③that are kin和that are not kin同为定语从句，分别修饰between…and…结构中两个并列的opponents。④定语从句that resemble those observed in humans修饰先行词the evolution of strategies，对其进行补充说明；此外，those指代those strategies observed in humans。⑤even if引导让步状语从句，说明即使“尽管亲缘鉴别并非尽善尽美”，也可得出上文提到的结论。
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