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  3. 1 Pundits who want to sound judicious are fond of warning against generalizing. Each country is different, they say, and no

1 Pundits who want to sound judicious are fond of warning against generalizing. Each country is different, they say, and no

admin2008-12-13  71
问题 1     Pundits who want to sound judicious are fond of warning against generalizing. Each country is different, they say, and no one story fits all of Asia. This is, of course, silly: all of these economies plunged into economic crisis within a few months of each other, so they must have had so mething in common.
2     In fact, the logic of catastrophe was pretty much the same in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea.  (Japan is a very different story. ) In each case investors -- mainly, but not entirely, foreign banks who had made short-term loans -- all tried to pull their money out at the same time. The result was a combined banking and currency crisis: a banking crisis because no bank can convert all its assets into cash on short notice; a currency crisis because panicked investors were trying not only to convert long-term assets into cash, but to convert baht or rupiah into dollars. In the face of the stampede, governments had no good options. If they let their currencies plunge, inflation would soar and companies that had borrowed in dollars would go bankrupt; if they tried to support their currencies by pushing up interest rates, the same firms would probably go bust from the combination of debt burden and recession.  In practice, countries split the difference and paid a heavy price regardless.
3     Was the crisis a punishment for bad economic management? Like most cliches, the catchphrase "crony capitalism"has prospered because it gets at something real excessively cozy relationships between government and business really did lead to a lot of bad investments. The still primitive financial structure of Asian business also made the economies peculiarly vulnerable to loss of confidence.  But the punishment was surely disproportionate to the crime, and many investments that look foolish in retrospect seemed sensible at the time.
4     Given that there were no good policy options, was the policy response mainly on the right track? There was frantic blame-shifting when everything in Asia seemed to be going wrong; now there is a race to claim credit when some things have started to go right. The International Monetary Fund points to Korea’s recovery -- and more generally to the fact that the sky didn’t fall after all -- as proof that its policy recommendations were right. Never mind that other IMF clients have done far worse, and that the economy of Malaysia -- which refused IMF help, and horrified respectable opinion by imposing capital controls -- also seems to be on the mend: Malaysia’s Prime Minister, by contrast, claims full credit for any good news -- even though neighboring economies also seem to have bottomed out.
5     The truth is that an observer without any ax to grind would probably conclude that none of the policies adopted either on or in defiance of the IMF’s advice made much difference either way. Budget policies, interest rate policies, banking reform -- whatever countries tried, just about all the capital that could flee, did. And when there was no more money to run, the natural recuperative powers of the economies finally began to prevail. At best, the money doctors who purported to offer cures provided a helpful bedside manner; at worst, they were like medieval physicians who prescribed bleeding as a remedy for all ills.
6     Will the patients stage a full recovery? It depends on exactly what you mean by "full". South Korea’s industrial production is already above its pre-crisis level; but in the spring of 1997 anyone who had predicted zero growth in Korean industry over the next two years would have been regarded as a reckless doomsayer. So if by recovery you mean not just a return to growth, but one that brings the region’s performance back to something like what people used to regard as the Asian norm, they have a long way to go.
选项 A、Countries paid a heavy price for whichever measure taken.
B、Countries all found themselves in an economic dilemma.
C、Withdrawal of foreign capital resulted in the crisis.
D、Most governments chose one of the two options.
答案D
解析     <1>a combined banking and currency crisis相当于both a banking crisis and a currency crisis。
    <2>stampede这里指恐慌的投资者将长期资产转成现金，将泰铢或卢布兑换成美元这样的行为。
    <3>plunge大幅度贬值
    <4>push up interest rates提高利率
    <5>go bust from the combination of debt burden and recession这里的from表示原因，go bust意思是“破产”。合在一起，意为：出于负债和经济衰退双重原因而破产。
    <6>In practice，countries split...指的是两种不同的措施之间的差别。split表示“一分为二”。在这里，split the difference的意思指那些国家在两种措施之间进行了平衡，各取一半。
    <7>“crony capitalism”表示一种基于(政企之间)友谊的资本主义。这里带有贬义。
    <8>disproportionate不相称的
    <9>The International Monetary Fund points to Korea’s recovery—and more generally to the fact that the sky didn’t fall after all—as proof that ns policy recommendations were right．注意这里的短语结构。point to sth．as...，意思是“把……看作是……”。
    <10>never mind别管……
    <11>on the mend在恢复中，在好转中
    <12>bottom out(经济衰退)达到最低点后开始渐渐复苏
    <13>without any ax to grind没有私人目的或企图。
    <14>either on or in defiance of the IMF’s advice on sb．’s advice表示“依照某人的建议； in defiance of sb.’s advice表示“不顾或违抗某人的建议”。
    <15>recuperative复原的，恢复的
    <16>At best，the money doctors who purported to offer cures provided a helpful bedside manner...这里，money doctors指IMF；bedside manner本意为“医生对病人的态度”，这里表示“同情关怀的态度”。作者这里使用了比喻的说法，由money doctor而说到bedside manner，后一段中作者将那些遭遇经济危机的国家称为patients，称其经济复苏为recovery。
    <17>a reckless doomsayer冒失的末日预言者。

本题为细节归纳题。从第2段可知，那些国家不管采取哪一种措施都会付出惨重代价。故A是作者的观点。从第2段中间部分，我们知道政府没有很好的选择，既不能让货币贬值又不能提高利率，因而的确处于两难境地，故B也是作者的观点。还是在第2段中，作者告诉我们正是因为外国银行同时抽回所投资金才导致金融和货币危机，故B也是作者的观点。第2段最后1句讲，那些国家在两种措施中权衡，兼而取之，故D不是作者的意思。
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